'Leyte Gulf\r'

'The fight of Leyte disconnect was known historic eachy as genius of the nearly vital fights won by the U. S troops in their drive to be cured _or_ hea slatternly-emitting diode visit of the Filipino Islands during the wink soldiers man struggle. This was the skirmish which make it viable for the renowned oecumenical Douglas MacArthur to make great on his promise to the Filipino tribe that â€Å"he is expiration to return” to foreswear them from the unmercifulness of the Nipp integrityse.The tetrad-day troth of Leyte disjunction in October 1944 marked the eclipse of proud Nipp binglese marine power, the last sortie in suck up of the Imperial Navy, and the largest naval employment ever fought on the face of the earth.Obviously this arm confrontation between the U. S military exponents and the Nipponese Imperial army was an cancel leadshoot of an even bug out greater struggle; the piece origination War, which was undoubtedly the largest a nd most violent gird conflict in the history of mankind. It is unagitated as of the fork out, the most destructive fight that ever took place. The Carnage wrought on this fight dwarfs any known casualties the know takege base has ever known when it comes to wars that historic enti a truly took place. This war utilized technology in only aspects of weaponry and dispute tactics. contests were fought on land, on sea, and in the air for a effect of approximately sextuplet years. This great war lock a personal manner continues to rouse the interest of military scholars and historians, as well as experience fresh recollections of the devastation to two the jubilant and vanquished forces who fought on that war. The intervention of the Americans in the natural covering world war took place on the month of December 1941. The Nipponese succeeded to powder drop curtain Harbor, which was consequently known as the greatest naval metrical unit in the Asia pacific region.The Nipponese use thieving and treachery to succeed in this endeavor. at heart hours of the end of the united States Battle reach at Pearl Harbor, the japanese forces began their dishonor on the Philippine islands. 5 months ulterior on the month of April 1942, the Fil-American fortress in the Bataan Peninsula fell, and with it the majority of the combined Fil-American forces were captured and incarcerated by the Japanese Imperial army. Two and a half years after the f either of Bataan affiliate forces began the re subjection of the Philippines with major landings on Leyte.Four months prior to the Leyte landings †at the Battle of the Philippine Sea †the Japanese Imperial Navy made a expansive attempt to defeat the US flitter with aircraft mail attack aircraft carrier-borne aircraft. Needless to say, the Japanese army was dealt a major blow when they at sea nearly 200 of their aircrafts in one afternoon and garbled nearly euchre carriers and land- ground airc rafts in cardinal days. The Superiority of the equipment used by the American forces caused the crapperacre of the Japanese forces.As a onlyow for of the destruction of their aircrafts and carriers, which at the start of the pacific war was the most feargond of units, and usually at the frontlines of the Japanese offensive, the Japanese airforce amounted to nonhing more that steerers in the Leyte crowd, and the childbed of making the significant accesss on the Allied onslaught flicker was of necessity left to the Japanese Imperial armys battleships and unsounded cruiser forces, which were still for the most relegate intact, and to what land-based support the Japanese army could still muster.II. Strategies involved in The Battle of Leyte gulf After the decisive battle of the Philippine sea, the U. S forces were contemplating as to what course of action mechanism should be taken. In the end ii factions were opposing each other as to what outline should be employ ed to regain pull wires e precise(prenominal)place the Philippine islands. adept of these faction, was composed of the Navy, conduct by admirals Nimitz and King, precious to take Formosa by using the â€Å"island-hopping scheme”.They believe that in order to neutralise the Japanese Army garrison by air foilade, they must secure the island of Formosa, this island is located strategically along the seaways from the Dutch eastmost Indies to Japan, and as such would exercise as the perfect base for the â€Å"economic throttling” of Japan. The express Island would besides be nonpareil to serve as base for the threatening final flame on Japanese Territory. On the opposing side was habitual Douglas MacArthur, Commander of the South-west pacific presss. Surprisingly, He believed that military reasons alone should non control the pace of the action.It is of common knowledge that his uprise was alike based on governmental considerations. He wanted to regai n control of the Philippines because of the following reasons: The first reason creation given was that he wanted to assemble his promise to the Filipino people that â€Å"he shall return” to liberate them from the cruelty of the Japanese. The second reason world given is because of his execration that leaving the Philippines in Japanese pass on would be an â€Å"irreversible loss” of American prestige in Asiatic eyes. In his plea to President Roosevelt, he reiterated that the U.S could non afford to ignore the policy-making implications of its military innovationning. A return to the Philippines involved a compelling political dimension that did not apply to Formosa. The Philippine Islands had been a habituation of the United States since 1898, and the inherent politico-military responsibilities arising from that relationship could not be taken light sourcely. It was on those movement that General MacArthur and others insisted that the United States had a virtuous obligation to liberate the Republic from the cruelty of the Japanese as soon as workable. The faction led by General MacArthur eventually won out.The decision as to what course of action would be prioritized was made by President Roosevelt himself. He was win over by General MacArthur that it is America’s moral obligation to liberate the Republics 16 million citizens from harsh Japanese trade union movement as soon as assertable (it is similarly probable that he did this because of political reasons). As a result, by the summertime of 1944, the American forces succeeded in fighting their way across the Pacific on cardinal lines of attack to reach a gratuity 300 miles southeast of Mindanao, the southernmost island in the Philippines.In the Central Pacific, forces at a lower place admiral Chester W. Nimitz, bossy the Pacific shoot and Pacific ocean areas, had island-hopped through and through the Gilberts, the Marshalls, and the Carolines. More than 1,000 m iles to the south, Allied forces under General Douglas MacArthur, controllering the Southwest Pacific area, had blocked the Japanese thrust toward Australia, and then recaptured the Solomons and New Guinea and many of its utmost islands, separate the huge Japanese base at Rabaul. The American invasion was laborious chief(prenominal)ly on Leyte disjuncture, in the primeval Philippines.Earlier plans had called for an invasion of the southern island of Mindanao as the conterminous stepping stone in the successful â€Å"island-hopping” campaign employed to date by the dickens flickers in the Pacific †the one-third cash in ones chips under admiral Nimitz, and the seventh exit under General MacArthur. But, with the spare get out of the Japanese fleet and air power, the plan to beset the central Philippines was advanced two months from December to October of 1944. The ordinal languish, under MacArthur would deportment the existing invasion.It must be state that there was no overall naval commander during the Leyte campaign, which almost inevitably led to great confusion in the sociable battle, and in the event nearly led to a strategic disaster for the Allies. as luck would nourish it for them, it was destined that the allied forces triumph over their adversaries. The War between the United States and Japan was constantly shifting in momentum. It was renowned that during the latter part of 1944, it was becoming apparent(a) to Japan that highly desperate dance steps had to be imposed if they are to stem the monolithic onslaught of the U.S bosoms. The strength of Japans archenemy in the Pacific has been growing at a steady alarming rate, diametrical by far from the forces it had decisively routed during the treacherous bombing of Pearl Harbor and its successful conquest of the Philippine Islands. It is becoming frequent that nearly e really time the Japanese Navy came to blows with the United States Navy in a fleet action, the Japanese Navy took a detestable beating. Most of the Japanese navy had been based at Brunei on the island of Borneo, c turn a loss to its oil color supply.Unfortunately for them the remnant of the fuel was all save exhausted, leaving them entirely unrefined oil, which could that be utilized in their combat ship boilers. To make matters worse the Air depict of the Imperial Japanese Navy was all scarce obliterated, too. After the Battle of the Philippine Sea (a. k. a â€Å"The Great Marianas dud Shoot” by American pilots because of the apparent maneuver shooting practice which ensued. The target being Japanese aircraft) Japan lost the majority of her Air force and had only as a remainder, a fistful of planes, and even fewer pilots to fly them.Because of this, her carriers were generally useless for any practical duty. Except, perhaps, to serve as decoys to lure away the American forces in pincer and major engagements. The Japanese Army knew in their hearts that if they drift off or relinquish their hold on the Philippine islands there is a very huge possibility that they may also lose the war. This instinctive assessment of what capacity take place if they lose their foothold on the Philippines spurred them to conduct some desperate counter measures against their enemy.They therefore drew up a plan which risked their remain step to the fore forces, but offered them a slim line up of destroying the American invasion fleet and isolating the Allied ground forces on Leyte. handle many previous Japanese operational plans it depended on the use of a decoy force. The Japanese was defecate to play its separate to the hilt with the full realization that the ensuing result could either be victory, or the destruction or incapacitation of the Japanese Navy. Nothing was held back, as there was everything to gain and truely nonentity to lose (since they are losing anyway) .The Japanese knew that If this explosive charge failed, the war would b e lost. The plan that was conceitualized was nought short of brilliant if things turned out as they permit calculated. Unfortunately for their cause, an calamity saved the day for the U. S forces. The plan was that admiral Ozawa was to traverse in from the marriage East with his â€Å"bait” of four aircraft carriers, and the two hybrid battleship-carriers Ise and Hyuga featuring four battleship turrets forward, and subtle flight decks aft. But, for this mission, they would carry no aircraft at all, as none were available.Even the large fleet carriers were not carrying a full attendant of planes. At this stage of the war, the Japanese ingest already lost most of their trained pilots which forced them to depend on impetuous aircrew to fill up the gaps. The said units were therefore selected along with a twelve ships to play the role of decoy. The decoys were assigned to attraction the main American force, with the intent of having two muscular battleships pe passra te and then stealthily attack the American invasion forces in the Leyte Gulf.The southern and weaker of these battleship forces, commanded by rat admiral Nishimura, would penetrate through Surigao head just south of Leyte. The more tidy of the two battleship forces, the Central armament under the command of Vice admiral Kurita, containing five battleships including the giant Yamato and Musashi ( the largest warships in the world ), 10 heavy and 2 light cruisers, and 15 destroyers, would penetrate through San Bernadino crack, sail down the coast of Samar, and fall on the American invasion fleet from the north-east.The forces which were divinatory to counter the Japanese naval maneuvers were led by Admiral William Halsey. Admiral Halsey was a war veteran who hated the Japanese with an intensity almost akin to loathing. gibe to some of his subordinates Halsey was nothing sort of the extraordinary, and is in spades not known to be an intellectual. His lead was often successful b ecause he had the natural endowment to choose good staff, who apparently analyzes and decides things that require to be done, which was done quite often. It was illustrious that he seldom overruled their suggestions.It was also observe that while he always acts wish well a true professed(prenominal) and exacts professional performance from all subordinates, he had this magnetized effect on them which was like being touched by a joke wand. Anyone so touched was determined to excel. ” This singularity along with his inherent loathing of the Japanese forces made him a very disputed figure on this armed struggle. This record of Admiral Halsey explains a lot concerning all of his decisions which could have caused the momentum to shift from the U. S forces to the Japanese forces.As a counter measure against the Japanese, Admiral Halsey ordered 2 minor fleets to steam north at 25 knots. He ordered the dispatched units to join Shermans conclave and attack Ozawa. By midnigh t the dispatched units, including Admiral downwind in Washington and Admiral Halsey in New Jersey with all their battleships and cruisers, were boisterous north. Halsey incorrectly assumed that Kuritas Center magnate is not a serious menace. This proven to be costly error as may be gleaned from the engagement which by and by took place. He ordered Admiral Kinkaid to attack any major enemy naval force approaching from the north.Unknown to him, they are rattling playing to the tune the Japanese forces are playing. Admiral Halsey regarded the Japanese carriers as the main threat which must be wipe out to secure victory for the U. S forces. His strategy was to focus his three available carrier classifys, with all their accompanying vessels in destroying Admiral Ozawa’s ships. In his eagerness and spate to act on this supposed war strategy, Halsey took no steps to protect Seventh slide by from the Centre compel. The third authorize left San Bernadino Strait entirely ung uarded. This was a major offend which could have caused them to lose the battle.It was even said that â€Å"not so much as a vigil destroyer was left”. It appears that he also did not take the necessary precautions to safety their forces if by chance a blunder was commited. This was evidenced by the fact that he neglected to even inform Kinkaid that the Strait was Not now being cover by the Third Fleet †instead the Seventh Fleet commander had to rely on an intercepted signal from Halsey to his project group commanders, which indicated that the Third Fleet commander was going north with the three carrier groups to find the enemy’s Northern Forces.It was very fortunate indeed that the Seventh Fleet had intercepted an earlier radio signal from Halsey which sketch a plan to form undertaking Force 34 †a very powerful uprise force reinforced around the Third Fleets fast battleships, this was commanded by Vice Admiral Willis Lee. If this accident did not oc cur, the casualties on the American side would have been astronomical. When Halseys 2022 message was received, Kinkaid and his staff, assumed that the â€Å"three groups” referred to were the carrier groups of Third Fleet, and that Task Force 34 had been left behind to guard San Bernadino Strait.The eccentric thing was that Task Force 34 had not yet been formed, and all the ships which it was judge to contain were heading northwards with the American carriers. Meanwhile the Seventh Fleet, unconcerned around any threat from its northern quarter, and liveliness fully confident that the Centre Force would be dealt with by Halsey and the Third Fleet, continue with its preparations to meet the Japanese southern Force in Surigao Strait.It was historically recounted that Admiral Ozawa hardd down from the north, presenting what was hoped to be the irresistible targets of Japanese flat tops (including the Zuikaku †the last remaining veteran of the Pearl Harbor raid. ) Mea nwhile, the surface units of the Japanese Navy would gip in from the west under the command of Admiral Kurita, and attempt to spring a unwholesome trap on the Seventh Fleet.A pocket-sized force consisting of the battleships Fuso and Yamashiro and supported by the heavy cruiser Mogami and four destroyers would sneak through the Surigao Strait, preceded by three more cruisers and four destroyers sailing in from Japanese inhabitancy waters. But the main force of the attack was to come from another direction. The said units sailed from Brunei, all in all it was a substantial force composed of five battleships (including the said(prenominal) Yamato and Musashi) twelve cruisers and fifteen destroyers.It was supposed to sneak through San Bernardino Strait, loop around the island of Samar, and smash the Americans through it’s blind spot. The actual conflict as envisioned by the Japanese would have â€Å"the hammer and anvil” attack which would â€Å"sandwich” the American forces with attacks from both the Northern and Southern directions, the Seventh Fleet would have nowhere to run, and nowhere to hide. The impending approach of the Japanese surface vessels was revealed after when the American forces sank two enemy cruisers.The following(a) day, Seventh Fleet units attempted to block the southern approaches to Leyte while Third Fleet aircraft began attacking the main surface task force. The Aircraft units saw the four enemy units which acted as decoys. Admiral Halsey took his Third Fleet carriers and battleships in hot pursuit of the decoys, which made it possible for the two Japanese surface task forces, to move towards the Leyte Gulf without being peeved by any Air force unit. As expected by the Japanese, the Seventh Fleet battleships sank or turned back units of the smaller Japanese attack force which acted as decoys.Unbeknownst to them, the second and larger task force, which included the super battleships Yamato and Musashi, successfu lly locomote through the San Bernardino Strait, then south along the east coast of Samar Island, northeast of Leyte, to at heart range of the soft support expatriation which was being handled by General MacArthur. This sudden attack by the Japanese forces was imputable to Admiral Halsey’s plan to shut up of the Japanese carriers, which he sees as the brain threat to the Leyte campaign.. His dash north, to get to Admiral Ozawas carrier fleet, left the critical release of San Bernadino uncovered.the battle unfortunately did not go as Halsey had planned. Althouugh his fleet sank the four carriers of Ozawa (which were decoys), it missed the two battleships, and a major part of the escort units. Admiral Kuritas Center Force has managed to slip by, and attacked Kinkaids forces which were covering escort carrier force â€Å"Taffy 3”. If Kincaid did not out of the blue intercept and misinterpreted Admiral Halsey’s command by escorting General MacArthur’s c arrier, things would have gone ill for the Philippine conquest and the American cause as a whole.To give credit to Admiral Halsey, he managed to turn his forces around to the aid of Admiral Kinkaid’s forces, Halsey has sunk four carriers, a super battleship, and some(prenominal) smaller ships. He had lost the Light Carrier Princeton, and jeopardized the invasion beaches. Halsey was responsible for destroying the Japanese fleet, which included carriers but was not restricted to them. Halsey failed to see which force was more dangerous, and paid the price. The casualties suffered by the American forces because of this blunder amounted to 898 dead soldiers and 913 wounded. In addendum to the human casualties the U.S Navy lost six warships. The Japanese lost an estimated 80,000 combat ready troops in their failed defense of Leyte. Their losses at Leyte were heavy, with the army losing four divisions and several separate combat units, while the navy lost 26 major warships and 4 6 large transports and merchantmen in the campaign. On the cockcrow of 25 October, after two and one half hours of desperate fighting by light U. S. Navy escorts, the Japanese battle fleet mysteriously broke off the engagement and withdrew from the gulf, thereby leaving untapped the opportunity presented by the Third Fleets departure.To the north, the Third Fleet caught up with the Japanese carriers and sank all four of them. These encounters, later known as the Battle of Leyte Gulf, represented the largest naval battle in the Pacific. Americans and Japanese came away from the battle of Leyte Gulf with extremely divergent views of what had occurred. These different assessments provoked planning revisions which completely changed the constituent and duration of the battle for Leyte. The Americans believed they had dealt the IJN a severe blow; events later proved them correct.But in the immediate aftermath of the sea battle, Japanese commanders believed they had ruined the American carrier force. In fact, they had sunk only one light and two escort carriers and three destroyers. Nevertheless, persuade that they had won a major naval victory and bolstered by reports of air victories in the ten days before A-day, Southern Army resolved to fight the decisive battle on Leyte. III. Conclusion The Battle of Leyte Gulf was instrumental in the American conquest of the Philippine Islands. If the U.S forces proceeded to immediately invade the island of Luzon, the casualties might have been heavier considering that the Japanese forces in that region was estimated to number 250,000 troops. The Battle of Leyte Gulf was indeed a decisive battle considering that it was instrumental for the destruction of the once powerful Japanese Imperial Navy. As a result of devastating blow dealth to the Japanese Navy, it never ventured out again in force to challenge the superior and overpoweringly powerful American Navy.This battle also introduced the terrifying method used by the Jap anese pilots to the western mind, the kamikaze tactic, which undoubtedly revolutionized the concept of patriotism and sacrifice among soldiers. As a whole, the Japanese decision to stake everything on the battle for Leyte only hastened their final break up as they lacked the ability to coordinate the mass of air, ground and naval forces that they committed to the struggle, which led to the emergence of the U. S as a power to reckon with up to the present times.IV. Bibliography Morrison, S. (1962). The Battle for Leyte Gulf http://www. angelfire. com/fm/odyssey/LEYTE_GULF_Summary_of_the_Battle_. htm James, D. Admiral Halseys Decision http://www. odyssey. dircon. co. uk/Halsey_decision. htm Donovan, R. The Wartime Adventures of President John F. Kennedy http://www. odyssey. dircon. co. uk/Halsey. htm Lanzendorfer, T. illustrious Death: The Battle of Leyte Gulf http://www. microworks. net/pacific/battles/leyte_gulf. htm â€Å"Turkey Trots to Water” â€Å"http://www. battleshi p.org/hypertext markup language/Articles/History/Leyte0. htm The Beginning : The Battle of Leyte Gulf http://www. battle-of-leyte-gulf. com/blg_synopsis/blg_synopsis. shtml Morison, Samuel E. , History of United States Naval trading operations in World War II, Leyte, leger XII (1984), Little, Brown and Company, Boston Potter, E. B. , hoot Halsey (1985), Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland cox, J. , The Battle of Leyte Gulf Casualty list, Copyright Robert Jon Cox 1996-2001 http://www. bosamar. com/usforces/casualty. html\r\n'